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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW'
give sane party a right they would have so enumerated in statute as
statute is a large and complete set of laws in itself. Judge Cardozo
in principal case stated: "Theory of annulment on the ground of
insanity is not that the sane spouse has made a bad bargain in getting
an insane partner. The theory is that the insane partner to the
union has manifested a consent that is unreal for lack of a con-
tracting mind." It is clearly for public good that such as principal
case be the law. Otherwise a man knowingly may marry an insane
woman and after having cohabitation dispose of her at will. The
only way that the sane spouse can get relief is by an amendment of
the statute that will extend the right of action. We are living in a
period when public welfare and interest demand legislature to make
strict regulations protecting the unprotected from such persons who
would take advantage if law were not as in principal case. Fact
that the law might work an undue hardship or an unjustice upon
many sane persons is counterbalanced by the fact that it prevents
the perpetration of many frauds.
MUNICIPAL. CORPORATIONS-ULTRA VIRES ACTS; HIGHWAY LAW
SEC. 282E As AFFECTING LIABILITY FOR ULTRA VIREs AcTs-Plaintiff's
intestate was killed through the negligence of defendant's employee
engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle. The vehicle was being
used by defendant's servants in the cleansing of sewer basins but at
the time of the accident the driver had taken it on a personal errand.
The foreman in charge of the sewer work testified that he had no au-
thority to let the truck leave the task but had not objected when the
driver said. he would take the car and time off to buy a Christmas
tree and carry it home. In fact it did appear that he told the driver to
"go ahead." Held, that Sec 282e of the Highway Law (L. 1924, ch.
534 and amendments thereto) applied and a verdict was found for the
plaintiff. Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed. The Appellate
Division unanimously held that the Highway Law did not apply inas-
much as the negligence complained of did not occur within the scope
of the corporate powers, was "ultra vires," and hence could not be
made the basis of an action for damages. Downing v. City of New
York, 219 App. Div. 444 (1927).
While a municipal corporation is liable to third persons resulting
from the negligence of employees engaged in cleaning or maintaining
public sewers, Lloyd v. Mayor, &c., 5 N. Y. 369 (1851); Seifert v. City
of Brooklyn, 101 N. Y., 136, 4 N. E. 321" (1885); Munn v. City of
Hudson, 61 App. Div. 343 (3rd Dept. 1901), it must be shown, as a
condition precedent to recovery, that the act complained of was within
the scope of the corporate powers conferred by statute. It is the policy
of the .law to limit municipal corporations strictly to the exercise of
powers granted them by their respective charters (19 R._C. L. 1138),
and if the act done was committed outside of the authority and power
of a corporation as conferred by charter, the corporation was not liable
whether its performance was directed by municipal officers, or it was
done without any express direction or command. Smith v. City of
Rochester, 76 N. Y. 506, 509 (1879); Mayor, &c., v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y.
165 (1849); Tilford v. Mayor, &c., 1 App. Div. 199 (1896) aff'd 153
N. Y. 671, 48 N. E. 1107 (1897); O'Donnell v. City of Syracuse, 184
N. Y. 1, 76 N. E. 738 (1906). Thus even though the persons causing
RECENT DECISIONS
the work to be done were its officers or agents, and assumed to act as
such in doing it, the municipality would not be liable if the acts were
"ultra vires." Stoddard v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 127 N. Y. 266,
27 N. E. 1030 (1891); Smith v. City of Rochester, supra. If it ap-
pears that the wrongdoer held an office or employment under the
municipality, if he was engaged in his personal business when he
caused the injury complained of, the municipality was not liable.
(19 R. C. L. 1339).
The decision of the Appellate Division is in accord with the fore-
going authorities. A municipality having no authority to divert its
property held for public purposes to the use of a private individual,
the act of the foreman in permitting the driver in the Downing case,
supra, to use the car for his own purposes was "ultra vires" whether
or not the foreman had the power to bind the city as an agent under
ordinary circumstances.
FEDERAL COURTS-CoMITY.-In an action in Trespass to try title
to an undivided one-third interest in a certain tract of land if Jeffer-
son County, Texas, Plaintiffs in error claim title first through a con-
veyance from Mary Green executed in 1850; second through a judg-
ment obtained in the District Court of Hardin. County, Texas, and
third by operation of the Statute of Limitations. Defendants claim
title through the heirs at law of Mary Green and also rely on
possession under Statute of Limitations. Held, for the defendants.
Where Federal court first construes a state statute, as to construc-
tion of which State Courts' decisions were conflicting, it is not there-
after obliged to follow contrary decision of highest State Court;
but where later decisions of State Court have become a rule of
property, in order to avoid conflict between State and Federal Juris-
diction, Federal Court should recede from former decision. Judg-
ment affirmed. Andrus v. Hutchinson, 17 Fed. (2) 472, (C. C. A.
5th, 1927).
The question of the construction of a Texas Statute, Laws 1907
C. 865, sec. 1, Amending Rev. St. 1895, Art. 2312, was involved and
the United States Circuit Court held that by virtue of this act defect
in Deed was cured and the deed was valid and admissible in evi-
dence, Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, (C. C. A. 5th, 1909). Subs6-
quently the Supreme Court of Texas. Holland v. Votaw, 103 Tex.
534, 131 S. W. 406 (1910), decided, in refusing a writ of error to
Court of Civil Appeals, that the act of 1907 (supra) does not under-
take to validate conveyances by married women that before were
invalid, even where the invalidity consists only of want of proper
acknowledgment. After decision by State Court the case of Downs
v. Blount, Blount v. Downs, 194 F. Ed. 1020 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912) came
back to Circuit Court and opinion originally handed down was ad-
hered to. A writ of certiorari was denied by U. S. Supreme Court
226 U. S. 609, (1912). When the principal case was brought on
appeal. Court stated * * * Where a Federal Court has first con-
strued a State Statute, it is not obliged thereafter to follow a decision
of the Supreme Court of the State to the contrary, although * * *
We prefer now to recede from the decision in Downs v. .Blount, and
to follow the Texas decisions, and to hold that the deed in this case
was absolutely void and conveyed no title. In another case, John
